Abstract Socrates' purposes, in his philosophical conversations with others, remain a puzzle. We review eleven distinct interpretive options, many of which stretch back more than a hundred years, finding all of them untenable. We then propose an original, twelfth interpretation as the most faithful and charitable alternative. Our discussion takes as its focus Plato's dialogue Laches as a representative of the aporetic dialogues.
Introduction
How to interpret Socrates' purpose in his philosophical conversations with others has remained a puzzling question that has persisted to this day, with a variety of approaches on offer, none of which has achieved consensus, though some hold more currency than others. In what follows, we investigate eleven distinct interpretive options, many of which stretch back more than a hundred years. We critique these interpretations, making clear that whatever insight and value they may have for a reading of Socrates and Plato, they are ultimately untenable. We then offer a novel, twelfth interpretation as the only plausible alternative. 1 In the course of analysis we have chosen to focus on Plato's dialogue Laches because it serves perfectly as a test case for reading a Socratic dialogue, and most of the issues raised here can be extrapolated from the present, more narrow, focus to a wider scope that includes without question all the aporetic dialogues and perhaps every dialogue in which Socrates is the principal figure. We aim to show that in interpreting Socrates one need not impose hidden meanings, esoteric clues, implicit messages, anachronistic ideologies or subversive intentions upon the Platonic dialogues in order to unlock their 'true' meaning but rather should note Socrates' own explicit words and their military campaigns in the decade that followed. The manner in which they lost, the bad decisions they made at crucial moments, is foreshadowed with dramatic irony by Plato in the dialogue. 2 We are meant to notice that turning away from and not taking up the philosophical life Socrates shares with us leaves us open, in our ignorance, to making colossal blunders, in which despite our intentions we are responsible for our own destruction. Indeed in cases like the one under discussion, nothing less than the survival of one's own community is at stake.
Taken at face value, the dialogue, after a lengthy dramatic prelude, is an investigation into ethical theory, searching for a definition of a human virtue. In what follows, we call this the Ethical Theory Interpretation. In modern times, this interpretation originated in Germany in the 1800s. Such an interpretation sees the dialogue's final perplexity as inviting a solution by the reader. The Ethical Theory
Interpretation remains the standard interpretation, outside of Germany, to the present day, although none of the alternatives within it has gained dominance. But there are at least nine additional alternatives to the Ethical Theory Interpretation as a whole, nearly all of which were first proposed in Germany, and each of which we will consider in turn.
Paul Natorp proposed what we call a Theory of Knowledge Interpretation: the search in the dialogues is not for an account of virtue but for an account of knowledge itself. 3 Where we seem to have the former it is only ever in service to and aiming at the latter. In view of the impossibility of reaching a resolution to the competing ethical theories, Max Hiestand proposed a Fruitlessness Interpretation. 4 The final perplexity is not an invitation to the reader to provide a definition of courage, but a sign of the impossibility of knowledge of virtue. One might think here of Clitophon's lament (at 408d-e) and the influence of Socrates upon ancient Skepticism. George Grote provided 2 A comparison of the generals' respective deaths, as depicted by Thucydides, with certain features of their definitions in the dialogue (namely, the claim that the man who in battle endures wisely holding a superior position is less courageous than his opponent, at 193a, for Laches; the claim that it is not proper for the general to take orders from the seer, at 198e, for Nicias) illuminates the connection Plato would like to draw between an interlocutor's refusal to take their ignorance seriously, to take up the philosophical life and grapple with one's ignorance, and the destructive consequences of continuing to act as though one knew what one was doing. 3 Paul Natorp, Platos Ideenlehre: Eine Einführung in den Idealismus (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1903) . 4 Dialogen (Zürich: 1923 (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1848) .
M. Hiestand, Das sokratische Nichtwissen in Platons ersten
6 P. Friedländer, Platon, vol. 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1928) . Page references to 3 rd edition, Berlin, 1964. 7 K. Hildebrandt, Platon: Der Kampf des Geistes um die Macht (Berlin: G. Bondi, 1933) .
full and true definition of courage by combining the individual elements proposed within the dialogue, in particular those elements of his interlocutors' definitions that
Socrates does appear to endorse, even if he refutes their arguments as wholes. As Steinhart (1850: 354) puts it, "all aspects of the concept they seek are explicitly stated in (191b8-c5) . The field of rescue work is another illustration that courage is no more enduring than yielding.
The courageous rescuer -for example, a shepherd searching for a lost sheep -will endure in searching only so far as it is wise so to act. At some point, the risk to the rest of the flock or to the shepherd herself will require yielding to necessity, not enduring in the rescue. The bivalence of the non-cognitive trait of endurance is of course not restricted to the areas of infantry and rescue work, but generalizes to all spheres of human conduct, even academic scholarship. It often requires more courage of a scholar to abandon a position than to persist in its defense. goods and evils and the science that knows goods and evils past, present, and future (198d, 199a) . Thus in whatever sense courage-in-ingots is the science of future goods and evils, it is precisely also the knowledge of all goods and evils, past, present, and future. It follows that courage-in-ingots is the whole of virtue, which contradicts
Woodruff's interpretation.
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Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith (2010: 157-166 24 There is a red herring in Brickhouse and Smith's exposition. At times they speak as if not ambiguity but the singular nature of the relation between pure and applied science is the key to reconciling the conflicting statements about the 'pure' knowledge of good and evil and the 'applied' knowledge that is courage. The example they give (2010: 164) is mathematical triangulation as opposed to navigational triangulation. "One would look in vain for any difference between them, as they both use precisely the same knowledge -the knowledge of triangulation." But certainly there is a difference. Navigational triangulation needs to know more than pure or mathematical triangulation: for example, it needs to know that stars are fixed points and that clouds are not. In general, any application of mathematical triangulation needs to know more than pure triangulation. Jörg Hardy, in Jenseits der Täuschungen-Selbsterkenntnis
The above alternatives of the Ethical Theory Interpretation -Wise Endurance, Knowledge Alone, and Ambiguity -agree that, in the words of Steinhart (1850: 354) , "all aspects of the concept they seek are explicitly stated in the course of the investigation, just as it stands." The agreement is that Socrates completely develops all the pieces of the virtue theory, though the artful construction of the dialogue leaves it to the reader to assemble the pieces. The final alternative of the Ethical Theory
Interpretation we consider is that the theory present in the dialogue is incomplete. Meister (1921: 108) sees the outlines of a different theory in the Laches, namely, the account of courage at Republic 430b as the power in the soul that unfailingly preserves right and lawful belief about what is and is not to be feared.
The Incomplete Theory Alternative needs to provide an explanation why Plato would write such a dialogue. Perhaps it is a "record of honest perplexity" (Vlastos 1954: 353) 27 or is a kind of advertisement to attend Plato's Academy, 28 or has a "mnemonic und Selbstbestimmung mit Sokrates, Göttingen: V&R, 2011 (116-136) , defends yet another ambiguity alternative. The ambiguity for him is that sometimes Socrates uses the word courage in an extensional sense (denoting the very same as the word virtue in this sense) and sometimes in an intensional sense (denoting a mere part of virtue). function": "a memory aid for those coming to know" (Erler 1987: 60) , or any number of other possibilities. Why the insiders would bother to read these advertisements when they could already have the 'real thing' is anybody's guess. One is reminded of Diogenes' quip to Hegesias, who had asked the former for one of his writings, "You are a simpleton, Hegesias; you do not choose painted figs, but real ones; and yet you pass over the true training and would apply yourself to written rules" (Diogenes Laertius,
Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 6.48).Consider, for instance, one more possibility, albeit an extreme one. One might even take Plato's disavowal of authenticity in the Seventh Epistle seriously and view his written corpus as playful, fictional sport, antiadvertisements, perhaps even prototypical disinformation or black propaganda to keep those who have not been properly initiated and prepared for the true, oral teaching busy and preoccupied with something else, the way one gives children playful tasks in order to tire them out. In which case maybe only those who saw through the ruse and realized it was not serious might be suited for his esoteric teaching. This would make those of us who have studied and do seriously study it the butt of one of the most colossal swindles imaginable, were it not for the simple fact that, whatever Plato intended and whatever he may have thought of his own written work, it represents one of the pinnacles of philosophical thought within the Western tradition. Authors' own opinions of their
work, and what they consciously intend thereby, are notoriously unreliable. Suppose
Plato did consider his written work to be merely amusing trifles, not worthy of posterity. History has judged otherwise, and as with the work of Kafka, it deservedly has had the last word even if against the author's own explicit intentions. Such possibilities for why Plato would write dialogues in which an incomplete ethical theory is present lead to alternatives to the Ethical Theory Interpretation as a whole, rather than alternatives within that interpretation. Natorp (1921: 10) says, "in the investigation, penetrating ever deeper, of the concept of that knowledge in which, according to Socrates, virtue consists, we will see unfold, step by step, the distinctive Platonic concept of knowledge." According to Natorp (1903: 19) , the Laches contains a correction, "at least a clarification", of the account in the Protagoras. In the Protagoras (at 356b-e) moral knowledge is "calculation based upon measurement of the pleasant and unpleasant consequences of actions", a "felicitous prediction of the temporal, empirical consequences of our actions." But in the Laches, the knowledge that is virtue is a "knowledge of a good that is one, that is at all times the same, that is immutable and independent of temporal distinctions" (1903: 19) . "In this insight lay the germ of an idea" (1903: 20)-namely, a principle of Plato's laws of thought as he developed them in other dialogues.
According to Natorp (1903: 20-21) , in writing the Laches Plato was aware of an "inner conflict" in "the two basic motives of the Socratic: on the one hand the ignorance of virtue and inability to learn, on the other hand virtue's unity with knowledge, which demands teachability." Natorp (1903: 21) sees Plato solve this problem in the Meno, "which, with the thesis of knowing as recollection-the most primitive version of the theory of forms, described in mythical terms-finally answered, and in doing so made 29 "Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik". Reprinted in Schriften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte ed. by A. Görland and E. Cassirer, vol. 1, Berlin, 1928 (336-366 The dialogue's discussion of definition uncovers the "definite, systematic opposition of the unity of the concept to the multiplicity of the cases, cases that are connected precisely through that unity to totality" (1903: 21). For Natorp (1903: 21) , the evidence confirming his epistemological interpretation of the Laches is what he calls its "most important achievement in the end: the unity in the concept of established knowledge" throughout temporal diversity: "Socrates shows that the knowledge in general of a thing is nothing different for past, present, and future, but is one and the same (198d)", foreshadowing "the immutable eternal" as the proper object of knowledge in Plato's theory of forms. Natorp (1903: 22) takes this, the last positive result in the dialogue, to explain the subsequent perplexity, with which the dialogue ends: "it was far more important at the time to note that the knowledge in which virtue as a whole consists is not the empirical knowledge of what once was, now is, or in future will be, especially not the 
Fruitlessness Interpretations
Hiestand (1923) has a simple and powerful argument against any interpretation that finds in the Laches the development of a theory, whether an ethical theory or a theory of knowledge: if the dialogue develops theoretical knowledge, then there must be progress towards that goal within the dialogue. But there is no such progress: the search in the dialogue is fruitless.
Hiestand finds four substantive Socratic propositions in the Laches:
Courage is a part of virtue. 2.
Courage is something good.
3.
Only wise endurance is good. 4.
Someone is good in that in which he is wise. Hiestand (1923: 38) notes that these four propositions are not proved and describes them as "called into question during lengthy discussions, but neither rejected nor established as correct (als richtig anerkannt)." He thinks that the contradictions between moral requirements and everyday experience remain unresolved in the dialogue, and that the perplexity at the end is real. He (1923: 38) describes the result of the dialogue as a whole: "military leaders -experts, we ought to suppose -find no conclusive answer. Socrates himself does not know how to solve the contradiction.
Therefore in both cases there is just one inescapable conclusion (unerbittliches Ergebnis) for all participants: the recognition of ignorance."
The "often expressed result" of Socratic examination in general is this "ignorance" (1923: 88). Accordingly, Hiestand (1923: 41) Socrates presumes to unmask our phony goals, but puts "no other creative deed in their place", leaving us "therefore only the bleak insight in our own inability (Unvermögen)", with the result that "this Socrates must become weary;; death can bring him nothing more bitter" (1923: 101).
Hiestand's distinctive claims about bitter fruitlessness are, as Fröhlich (2007: 157) points out, at odds with Socrates' "reflective search for knowledge" and in to Socrates than bitter fruitlessness, namely, "the creation and furtherance of individual, self-thinking minds, each instigated to form some rational and consistent theory for itself." For Grote (1885: 421) this result "is a material benefit, even though no further aid be rendered to the process except in the way of negative suggestion.
That such minds should be made to feel the arbitrary and incoherent character of that which they have imbibed by passive association as ethics and aesthetics,-and that they should endeavour to test it by some rational and consistent standard-would be an improving process, though no one theory could be framed satisfactory to all. The Sokratic Elenchus went directly to this result.
Subjectivity, that is, thinking for oneself, even if one's thoughts are
unsatisfactory to some others, is Socrates' aim in the Laches. Such subjectivity is a very modest improvement upon bitter fruitlessness. Surely Socrates himself would deny that such thinking for oneself is a benefit for any human being.
For every man who knows not how to make use of his soul it is better to have his soul at rest and not to live, than to live acting according to his own caprice; but if it is necessary for him to live, it is better after all for such a one to spend his life as a slave rather than a free man. The following reasoning seems to lead to this interpretation:
1. There must be something more positive to be learned from Socratic dialogue than bitter fruitlessness! 2. But there is evidently no progress in theoretical knowledge in a Socratic dialogue. 3. Thus there must be progress in non-theoretical knowledge.
According to Friedländer (1928: 44) , "it is wrong to see the Laches simply as an investigation concerning the nature of courage, to see its issue as a definition that one might suppose is easy to formulate out of the basic approaches in that investigation. In contrast, the overall meaning of the slice of world which is pictured [ theory or as a theoretical investigation. For Friedländer (1928: 44 ) the "theoretical investigation concerning courage" is just a part of the "total educational process"-a process that leads not to a theory, nor to fruitlessness or subjectivity, but in the best case to a life of virtue, which is the examining life.
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Non-propositional knowledge might be either practical know-how or it might be knowledge by acquaintance. Friedländer proposes that the goal of a Socratic dialogue is both. On the one hand -as to the goal being a kind of know-how - Friedländer (1928: 64) describes the goal of Socrates' activity as the activity of that life itself, a life spent examining oneself and others. 156), a life that Friedländer (1928: 162-3) describes as the "being of the righteous man, which raises him to the level of the gods."
On the other hand -as to the goal of a dialogue being knowledge by acquaintance -Friedländer's interpretation of Socrates is connected to his interpretation of Plato, a Plato who has no theory of Forms but somehow still offers us a 34 Like the Philosophical Interpretation (defended below), Friedländer interprets Socrates intentionally to direct the discussion to a false start in every dialogue where he seeks to define a part of virtue. Fröhlich (2007: 182) criticizes such an interpretation by asking the rhetorical question: "Has Socrates in all the virtue dialogues intentionally posed a false question?" Unlike the Philosophical Interpretation, Friedländer lacks the resources to explain why Socrates would do such a thing. 35 One can object that Friedländer and others sharing this view shift the problem of interpretation from a textual/theoretical one to a lived and embodied/practical one. Since we allegedly get no clear answers to the theoretical questions, we are supposed to look to how Socrates lived and conducted himself (as providing the hidden 'answer'). Clearly, the Cynics did this. But, Socrates' life and conduct have themselves been the subject of various interpretations and emphases (Aristippus, Antisthenes and Plato would presumably all in some sense claim to be following the example of Socrates but they live and practice fundamentally different philosophical projects). Now, instead of arguing over Plato's/Socrates' theory in the dialogues we argue over what Socrates as living example signifies. Friedländer (1928: 57) unites the wisdom that is know-how and the wisdom that is knowledge by acquaintance in the following way. The knowledge by acquaintance or "vision" of the Forms cannot be expressed in the words of a theory but in the activity of a life: living and knowing are "linked into an inseparable unity." Friedländer, Fröhlich (2007: 157) distinguishes "theoretical knowledge" (theoretischem Wissen) from the "ineffable knowledge" (kein aussagbares Wissen) that is the goal of a Socratic dialogue. Like Friedländer, she (2007: 269) sees that knowledge as both know-how (namely, "skill at examination", Prüfungskompetenz) and knowledge by acquaintance (described as "nonconceptual insight", nicht-begriffliche Einsicht). Like Friedländer, she (2007: 270) sees "virtuous being" (tugendhaften Seins) in the Socratic act of "examining and seeking": "the course of the dialogue shows that Socrates exercises courage." And like Friedländer, she (2007: 271) unites knowledge by acquaintance with know-how in action: Socratic dialogue is "a unity of knowledge and life experience, of theory and praxis. The virtue discussed in dialogue is not merely viewed but realized." there would be no need to worry about whether one's deeds and words are in harmony, for virtue would not be able to be put into words. One would simply act virtuously without being able to give it utterance in speech.
In addition, any interpretation that, like Friedländer's or Fröhlich's, identifies the philosophical life with a virtuous life conflicts with Socrates' account in the Apology of three levels of wisdom.
The highest level is "real wisdom" (23a5-6), which is the property of God, not human beings. The middle level is being "wisest among men" (23b2), which is the property of anyone who, like Socrates, "knows that he does not possess real wisdom of any value" (23b3-4). The lowest level is "not being wise, but seeming wise, especially to oneself" (21c6-7). Socrates is as wise as a mortal can be -no one is wiser -because only God possesses wisdom and because Socrates is significantly wiser than people who are ignorant even of their ignorance (Rudebusch 2009: 20) .
Socrates knows that, being ignorant, he is unable to teach people virtue. This is why he refuses to accept payment for his time. Bringing people from the lowest level (which is bad) to the middle level (which is neither good nor bad) is the best he can do.
Such an achievement is a significant gain -it removes the guilt of reckless, albeit unintentional, wrongdoing from our life. 37 But Socrates neither teaches nor shows us how to be virtuous. A better interpretation will be more faithful to the text. Hadot sums up his view as follows: "There was a Socratic style of life (which the Cynics were to imitate), and the Socratic dialogue was an exercise which brought
Characteristic of the Praxis
Socrates' interlocutor to put himself in question, to take care of himself, and to make his and care of the self (epimeleia heauton). Instead of a portrayal of the care of the self as a care for the soul (and an attendant ethics of purification), in the Laches Foucault sees the care of the self portrayed as a test of life, as a putting oneself and others to a test that will reveal their relation to the truth and how that relation may need to be adjustedhow one's way of life may need to be changed in order to become able to speak the truth and act in accordance with it. Here the aim of philosophy is not merely to understand the truth but to live it, to make a practice of living in a way that is characterized by speaking the truth and acting in harmony with one's own words.
Speaking frankly is a Socratic practice in which the socially prevalent use of manipulative rhetoric and flattery is suspended so that philosophical discourse may take its place. Thus, according to Foucault, the two old men (Lysimachus and Melisias) have set things up so that parrhēsia can prevail in their conversation, in order to have a chance to find a genuine answer to their question. They need those who know about courage honestly to tell them if the display of fancy fighting that they have just seen is the sort of thing that can help their sons care for themselves properly so that the latter will bring honor to their family and city. Foucault also reads Nicias' warning to the party (187e-188c) as an apt characterization of the Socratic practice of examination.
According to Nicias, Socrates questions a person in such a way as to force them to give an account of themselves and the way they are living and have lived. Socrates invites his interlocutor to explain himself, "to show the relationship between himself and logos (reason) " (2011: 144) . In other words, those who are subject to philosophical examination must show that the words that they speak in a discussion, the reasons that they give in an argument, have the right relationship with their way of life, with the actions they choose. The main question is then whether one is living properly, not whether one has made pleasant conversation or been a persuasive speaker. This is what philosophical truth-telling aims to uncover and lay bare. The language Nicias uses to describe Socrates -as someone who "puts to a test" (βασανίσῃ, 186 a3) himself and others -evokes the image of a touchstone, that is, a stone used to test precious metals to see if they were genuine. Socrates himself and his philosophical practice, his way of conducting philosophical inquiry in dialogue with others, is a sort of touchstone by which the accounts which others give are tested and it is discovered whether they are genuine, whether they are valuable (like gold) or not. What passes the test is approved as suitable for living well, what fails the test is rejected. As (Foucault 2011: 145-146) points out, the test is not something which happens when one is young and in school but is instead something which recurs throughout life; one must always be ready for reexamination and re-assessment. We see this theme of 'late-learning' played out frequently in Plato, of education as a process that one undergoes throughout life. In an unsettling way, Socrates' negative critical scrutiny uncovers philosophical ignorance, a scrutiny that all claims to knowledge and wisdom must be tested against. He is thus not the sort of teacher who passes on positive doctrine to students.
Foucault reads the aporetic ending as suggesting three results: First, Laches' and Nicias' failure to accept their respective refutations is a good sign and entails that they will seek to remedy their flawed understandings of courage. 40 Next, Socrates over the course of the conversation has been identified as the one most worthy of trust, the one to lead the others toward knowledge of courage -even if he does not know it himself, he is best equipped to help them find someone who does. Finally, Socrates suggests that since none of them have shown that they know what courage is, and since he does not claim to be a teacher with knowledge to share, what is needed is for them all to look for a teacher who can help them. Foucault says that we should not read this as a literal request by Socrates, as though he thought there was actually some person in Athens who could tell them truly what courage is, but rather "This teacher…is of course logos itself, the discourse which will give access to the truth" (2011: 151).
Gonzalez proposes a third version of the Praxis Interpretation. Like Friedländer, he claims that Socrates exhibits the virtue of courage by his conduct in the dialogue (1998: 37). But Gonzalez does not claim that the definition of courage is ineffable.
Unlike Laches, Socrates is skilled in the use of argument in the search for truth and capable of looking "beyond experience" (1998: 37). Unlike his two interlocutors, Laches and Nicias, Socrates does not overconfidently take himself to have the ability to argue for a correct definition of courage. Socrates' superiority over his two interlocutors is tied to his professed ignorance, because of which he never assumes based either on his experience or his reasoning ability that he knows anything with certainty. He has "a knowledge which is compatible with ignorance and is not a techne" (1998: 38). Like Friedländer, Hildebrandt takes Plato's ultimate concern to be political reform in the state. He thinks it is a fundamental mistake to see Plato as intellectually seeking to grasp the logical structure of the world, as one "who disengages from space and time to establish an abstract, eternal system" (1933: 13). Instead he interprets the early dialogues as reflecting Plato's struggle for political power in Athens, writing them in order "to gather, in the space of a few years, followers that would renew the state" and become co-regents with Plato (1933: 105) .
In the Laches, Plato portrays two men of war, Laches and Nicias. Hildebrandt (1933: 92) takes Laches to represent the proper nature for a good soldier, and Nicias to represent an incompetent and unsatisfactory nature. Laches "sees in Socrates the stuff that always is operative in the history of spirit, and he sees in the sophist the beautiful appearance that a real man stands against " (1933: 87) . Laches has "courage in his blood" not his intellect;; he has "what it takes to be a true student of Plato" (Anlagen des echten Platonschülers, 1933: 90) . Nicias lacks "creative blood", and unlike Laches he does not recognize that Socrates is the true educator and nation builder. Nicias wrongly believes "that we come to excellence and wisdom through merely intellectual learning" (1933: 88 distinction between fearlessness and courage as sophistry, Socrates says "Nicias seems worthy of consideration" and that "whoever wishes to grasp the greatest things must have a share in the greatest intellect." Again, as Fröhlich (2007: 197 ) also points out, there is no more evidence that Laches' approved "harmony of word and deed" is Plato's favorite idea than ideas expressed by Nicias, for instance, that courage is knowledge of what is and is not to be feared or that a man is good insofar as he is wise. Finally, it is worth noting as well that while Laches may approve of the "harmony of word and deed", when refuted he admits to Socrates his failure to achieve it. If Laches is supposed to represent an endorsement of the importance of harmonizing word and deed, Hildebrandt needs to explain why Plato represents him as failing to harmonize his own words and deeds.
We agree with Fröhlich's assessment (2007: 198) : "If Hildebrandt cannot prove that Plato assesses Nicias as unfit and prefers Laches, then he is subject to the suspicion that it is his own anti-intellectual prejudice that discounts Nicias, promotes Laches, and projects these judgments onto Plato." As Fröhlich (2007: 205-8) shows, Hildebrandt's interpretation is more accurately attributed to Callicles and Thrasymachus than to
Socrates and Plato: "Plato is, according to such an interpretation, nothing but a tyrant" (2007: 208) . It is no wonder that scholars have largely ignored Hildebrandt's antiintellectual interpretation of Plato since Hitler's defeat in 1945.
The Unwritten Doctrines Interpretation
Aristotle tells us (Physics 209b) that Plato orally taught some doctrines without writing them down. According to the Unwritten Doctrines Interpretation, the "very heart of Platonic ontology", is composed of certain "principles of doctrine whose application consists in the reduction of all types and relationships of beings to a few simple entities" (Krämer 1959: 455) . 41 As Fröhlich (2007: 233) describes it, "in the logical and mathematical investigations of the inner academy [ . . . ] all entities -sensory appearances, mathematical objects, the Forms -are reduced to two opposing principles, and their interactions in the different realms of reality are systematically apprehended through proofs of analogous structures and laws of being." The resulting, unwritten ontology is, according to Krämer (1972: 442 n. 112) , "the core and summit of Platonic dialectic, indeed, of Platonic education overall." Krämer's (1959: 477) distinctive proposal was that "previous research was wrong in ascribing the ontology of principles only to late Plato." Krämer ascribes to the Socratic dialogues three functions: (i) to attract talented students to Plato's Academy,
(ii) to earn the respect of the untalented, and (iii) to remind insiders of the oral teachings by reference and hints.
The Unwritten Doctrines Interpretation explains the negative ending of each virtue dialogue as follows: "the appropriate philosophical basis, especially the solution of the problem of the apparent ambivalence and relativity of value, is certainly beyond the written dialogues in the esoteric realm of speculation about ontological principles" (Gaiser 1959: 107) . In the case of the Laches, Gaiser (1961: xv) takes the reference to 'going back to school' at the end of the dialogue as further evidence that the dialogue points "beyond itself to a higher knowledge", a knowledge reserved by Plato for oral instruction only in his school. The virtue dialogues are meant to convey "that we must first learn the crucially important [but unwritten] knowledge" taught in the Academy (Gaiser 1959: 116 Erler (1987: 60) adds that the virtue dialogues serve the additional role of "memory aid for those coming to know" -that is, for students hearing oral instruction in the Academy. He proposes that, "whenever the discussion leads to aporia or paradox, the cause is not in the logos itself, but is seen in the understanding of the interlocutor" (1987: 277) . The typical mistake of the interlocutor is to fail to understand properly true statements, interpreting them in a false, "this-worldly, technical" way as belonging to the "world of becoming " (1987: 278) .
Like the Ethical Theory and the Theory of Knowledge Interpretations, the Unwritten Doctrines Interpretation sees Socrates' goal within the dialogue as a theoryultimately metaphysical instead of ethical or epistemological. Thus Gaiser (1959: 228) :
"I see proper Platonic philosophy in the first place as converting people to the Form of the Good and thereby joining them to the Divine. The knowledge of virtue consists in the ability to view the principles and norms that are grounded in ontology-this is the aim of Plato's protreptic, logical philosophy" -that is, the virtue dialogues such as the
Laches. Unlike competing Theory interpretations, the Unwritten Doctrines
Interpretation is able to give a satisfactory account of the negative ending of a Socratic dialogue. As Wieland (1982: 44-5 ) puts it, "in the dialogues those [solutions] are never revealed, by which we might directly view, as such, the philosophical theory proposed by Plato. Once we are aware of it, it is natural to seek Plato's philosophical theory in another place, for example in his unwritten teachings".
There are two main problems with the Unwritten Doctrines Interpretation. In the first place, as Fröhlich (2007: 234) puts it, "difficulty with sources makes problematic the reconstruction of Platonic esoteric -indeed unwritten -doctrines." What this means is that even if Plato did have an esoteric doctrine and even if the dialogues are only the first step of an educational process that culminates in such a doctrine, in the absence of more reliable evidence regarding that doctrine, we can merely conjecture about it based on what others, with various agendas and axes to grind or at various historical removes from the Academy in Plato's time, have written. Moreover, we trivialize the explicit content of the dialogues we have for the sake of principles, imputed to Plato, concerning which we can only conjecture as to how he would have treated them himself. A few abstract principles or an intellectual vision of these principles or the ontological entities upon which they are based, or a method that leads students to such mystical insight-all these pale in comparison with what the dialogues explicitly provide us. As Wieland (1982: 43) says, "The two sides of any dialogue contain in any case far more philosophical substance than anyone has been able to reconstruct as communicable content of the unwritten teachings". In the second place, no bare principle, or handful of principles, will save our lives in the manner Socrates seeks. What we need, rather, is practical expertise at human well-being, analogous to say, the craft of medicine in improving our souls, or to the craft of navigation in guiding us best through life. How would such principles, or a vision that catches sight of the ontologically primordial entities from which they derive, provide practical human expertise at living well in the Socratic sense? Having such a vision that grants one the 'truth' for all time as something now permanently possessed is at odds with the practical life of self-examination and cross-examination of others that is represented in the figure of Socrates, who rather suggests that we do not yet know what we need to, that the truth is still out there for us to discover, that we remain on the way to it, hunting it and chasing it down, and are anything but mystical epopts whose ignorance has been replaced with a kind of revealed knowledge.
The Philosophical Interpretation
The Philosophical Interpretation takes at face value Socrates' account in the Apology of his life of cross-examination of others. The goal of a Socratic dialogue is to save a life from the guilt of reckless negligence by changing it from bad to neither good nor bad. 42 According to this interpretation, Socrates is not trying to develop a theorybe it ethical, epistemological, or metaphysical. Nor is he trying to develop nontheoretical know-how or give us a vision of the Form of the Good. His goal is to change non-philosophers into philosophers, by removing the interlocutor's pretence of wisdom about the only thing of real value, human well-being. Even if the philosophical life never acquires wisdom, it is not fruitless. This is because, unlike the non-philosopher, the philosopher lives free from guilt.
Socrates realizes, both on the authority of the oracle and on the basis of his own examination of three classes of men -politicians, poets, and craftworkers -that no human being, but only a god, might possess the highest level of wisdom, namely expertise at producing human well-being (23a). Yet the philosophically examining life at the middle level is worth living, while, as Socrates says, a non-philosophical or non-examining life at the lowest level is not (38a). The difference between the middle and lowest levels is that philosophers recognize their own ignorance, while nonphilosophers do not. [reference removed] proposes that the fatal flaw of the lowest level, the non-examining life, is its guilt: as Socrates says, "this ignorance, which thinks
that it knows what it does not, must surely be culpable" (ἐπονείδιστος, 29b2). Thus whenever Socrates discovers a pretender who "does not possess excellence but says he does" (29e5-30a1), Socrates finds him worthy of "blame" (ὀνειδιῶ, 30a1) and makes it his goal to make the other aware of the ignorance and so to convert him to the life of a philosopher.
How can the philosopher, at the middle level, be free of guilt (neither good nor bad) and the non-philosopher, at the lowest level, be guilty (bad), when both are alike ignorant of how to live well as human beings? Rudebusch (2009: 23-24) , using homicide as an example, distinguishes the relevant levels of guilt. The highest two levels of guilt accrue to voluntary wrongdoing: premeditated murder and murder committed on the spur of the moment, as a crime of passion. While these two levels are established legal distinctions, Socrates denies that they have any moral application to human beings, since "no one willingly does wrong" (Gorgias 509e). Rudebusch defends
Socrates' denial on the authority of the oracle: we all lack the expertise to judge even whether to live or die is a harm or benefit. Indeed Socrates finds "culpable" those who think they know that death is something bad, in the passage quoted above (29b). Yet there remains a distinction between two kinds of involuntary wrongdoing, between for example homicide as a result of negligence or recklessness, which of course is culpable, and accidental homicide, which is guilt free. As Rudebusch (2009: 26) points out, it is reckless negligence that Socrates accuses Meletus of, "saying Meletus is unrighteous because he 'treats serious matters frivolously' (24c5-6)." Meletus, as we might say, is playing with fire or going off half-cocked. Indeed, as Rudebusch (2009: 27) says, anytime Socrates finds a pretender to knowledge -that is, a non-philosopher -he imputes guilt to him. Socrates "will blame him for scorning the things that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth" (30a1-2).
That the unrighteousness of such scorn and misguided care is involuntary does not free the pretender from guilt [ . . . ] Socrates' accusers do not intend to act
unrighteously. Yet Socrates warns that they ought to beware, because "the real difficulty is to escape the condition of being wicked, which is quicker than death [ . . . ] My accusers, who are clever and quick, have been overtaken by the faster, by wickedness [ . . . ] they will go away convicted by truth herself of depravity and unrighteousness" (39a7-b6). Simply not intending to act unrighteously is not enough, then. Rather, one must in addition do everything in one's power to ensure that one does not act unrighteously, so that even if one unwittingly is responsible for harm to oneself or others, one will not be culpable because every precaution has been taken.
To explain the guilt Socrates has in mind, Rudebusch gives an analogy. The non-philosopher, undertaking all sorts of actions as a human being, bears the same type of guilt as a gunner shooting blindly or carelessly.
The decision to raise a child, to make friends with another person, or to go to collegeany of these choices might lead to disaster for oneself or others. Like such activities of human life, the use of firearms might lead to serious harm. Because of the risks, everyone will agree that if I don't know how to use firearms, it is better for me not to use them at all than to play with them ignorantly (2009: 22) .
The philosopher by contrast, lives a guilt free life. By actively striving to find out how to act as virtuously as possible and not presuming falsely to already have figured this out, the philosopher avoids being recklessly negligent and any harm done to himself or others is nothing more than an unfortunate accident for which no one is to blame.
Like the Fruitlessness interpretation in either its Bitter or Think for Yourself version, the Philosophical Interpretation sees as Socrates' goal in the Laches to demonstrate to Laches and Nicias their ignorance. But the point of the demonstration is neither to show them their bitter fruitlessness nor to stimulate them to think for themselves. It is to lead them to a guilt free life. Rudebusch (2009: 28) gives the following reason to show that Socrates valued such a guilt-free life:
Socrates says that he is free of guilt, even unintentional guilt, and knows that his guiltfree condition is an even rarer achievement than that of an Olympic champion. This is why he proposes that the city provide him free meals in the Prytaneum, an honor reserved for champions and heroes, on the grounds that he "never intentionally wronged anyone" (37a5), an achievement that he also describes as "never wronging any one" (37b2-3).
If Socrates aims to free us of the guilt of living an unexamined life and recklessly endangering ourselves and others, we can explain the structure of the Laches and take away this moral: we must either reckon with our ignorance or risk ruining ourselves, our loved ones, and community. 
Conclusion
While we no longer have Socrates around to goad us from out of our slumber, we are fortunate to still possess the Socratic dialogues authored by Plato. We began by posing the problematic situation for interpreting these dialogues and the wealth of conflicting views as to how one should read them. Our assessment of the alternatives leads us to endorse the Philosophical Interpretation. Alone among the alternatives, it does not impose a hidden, extraneous, or ideological significance upon the dialogue, nor violate the letter of the text in order to explain to us its spirit and meaning.
Socrates intends to demonstrate that his partners in conversation are mere pretenders to knowledge and seeks to convert them to a life spent in search of wisdom, a life that is free of guilt, unlike that of non-philosophers. It is only through such a life that we escape the unwitting guilt characteristic of the life we lead before such conversion, that of not knowing that we do not know and yet acting as though we do, a form of hubris that in Plato's presentation of the Socratic mission provokes not divine nemesis but rather an all-too-human poetic justice, a case of being undone by our own 'blind spot', as Nicias is undone by his over-reverence in Sicily and Laches at Mantinea by his inability to distinguish the wisdom that should accompany courage as anything other than prudential calculation, which latter he cannot accept since it eliminates the risks of the unknown that are a condition for displaying courage in the first place.
Laches then, must obstinately ensure that he runs risks where he need not, in order to be courageous, and in practice this amounts to ceding to his own strategic advantage to his enemy and engendering thereby his own defeat. He would rather be a more courageous fool than a less courageous sound-minded victor in spite of his admission in the dialogue that courage, being a fine thing, cannot be foolish. Each of us, too, Plato's
Socrates would suggest, has just such a blind spot so long as we persist in the belief that we know more than that we are ignorant. Unless we, too, confront the depth of our ignorance we are just as much in danger as the two generals.
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